On February 24, 2022, Russian troops and tanks crossed the Ukrainian border. The main response from the West was the imposition of the toughest and most comprehensive economic sanctions in a century, equivalent to a full-scale economic war. One of the generals in this war was Mario Draghi, who stated in June 2022, “Sanctions work. The International Monetary Fund predicts that this year the cost to the Russian economy will be equivalent to 8.5 percentage points of GDP. Time has revealed and is revealing that these measures are increasingly effective.” According to Enrico Letta (March 2022), “the sanctions are very tough and are hurting Russia badly, which is close to default.” These predictions were contradicted by what happened afterward. Armed conflicts are often determined by economic power, while the intricate interaction between history and politics plays a crucial role in shaping a nation’s economy and how it responds in times of crisis. So why didn’t the Russian economy collapse? This is an embarrassing question that has been removed from public debate because a year ago experts reassured that sanctions would quickly bring to its knees a country considered “a gas station with nuclear weapons.” It doesn’t seem that this view of Russia has proven to be correct. As an observer, I’ve formed an opinion.

I have had many Russian collaborators, and I have been to Russia several times from the 1990s until before Covid. Therefore, I had the opportunity to see up close what has happened in the last thirty years and to discuss with various Russian academics as well as with many students who have worked with me, including in Rome. In the 1990s, Russia experienced an economic crisis much worse than the one in 1929: the entire economy contracted by 50% with skyrocketing inflation, endemic alcoholism, a surge in suicides, and a life expectancy for men of only 57 years, lower than during Stalin’s rule. To survive, a university professor in St. Petersburg, my colleague, had to grow potatoes on his balcony. Compared to that situation, there have been huge improvements, and this new economic and social stability underlies Putin’s political success. My colleague and friend, who unfortunately passed away last year due to Covid, in recent years no longer grew potatoes and managed to survive on his university professor’s salary. Another colleague, a theoretical physics professor, until a few years ago worked as a nighttime Uber taxi driver, to the surprise of passengers who encountered a driver who spoke perfect English, was an expert in American literature, and listened to Shostakovich while driving. Compared to the 1990s, it was a different world. Not only economically but also in terms of Russia’s new status as a major power, albeit smaller than the USSR.

In theory, Western sanctions were designed to paralyze Russia and destroy this newfound prosperity. Targeted measures were supposed to disrupt the trade in materials and technological components, of which there is a great need. Meanwhile, the Russian central bank had over 60% of its reserves frozen by the West. Russia was cut off from SWIFT, the international banking system; in a globalized world, this was seen as a direct mortal blow to the heart of the Russian economy. The general consensus expressed by experts, economists, and the media predicted the imminent economic catastrophe of Russia. Predictions ranged from the complete collapse of the Russian financial system to hyperinflation, to a catastrophic 15% contraction of GDP by the end of 2022. Yet, a year later, despite even the explosion of gas pipelines, the Russian economy is still developing and seems to have exceeded every gloomy prediction. By the end of 2022, GDP had only slightly decreased, inflation had increased but much less than expected, and unemployment had reached historic lows, while the state treasury had filled with money. All of this is the result of rapid action by the Russian state and years of preparation, but also a misunderstanding of today’s Russian reality by Western governments, a vast country with enormous natural resources needed by everyone, starting with emerging countries like China and India. Given this outcome for a country with a GDP equal to 3% of those of the G7 countries that imposed sanctions, one wonders: does GDP really fully measure the state of the economy? Despite Russia’s excessive dependence on energy exports, Europe has become equally dependent on Russian energy. In fact, throughout 2022, Russia used the proceeds from oil and gas sales to Europe to continue its campaign in Ukraine. Subsequently, while most European countries shifted much of their energy imports away from Russia to other suppliers, paying much higher prices that contributed to inflation, Russia’s trade with non-Western countries, which did not impose sanctions and represent 85% of the world’s population, boomed.

In a moment when the international geopolitical situation is changing rapidly, it is not easy to make reliable predictions about Russia’s sustainability in the long term. But we can be sure that it will take a long time before collaborative scientific and cultural relations can be reestablished: Western Russophobia, the absurd identification of Russian culture and citizens with their government, has created a rift that will remain open for many generations.