During his hearing before the Chamber of Deputies, Mario Draghi highlighted how, over time, public spending has been sacrificed—compressing domestic demand, neglecting infrastructure, and cutting investment in research, technological innovation, and climate policy. But who exactly is the subject of this “we”? Draghi himself, of course—starting with the famous letter he co-signed with then ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, a line later followed by the Monti government.

Yet there is a crucial point: research and technological innovation cannot be improvised in a matter of months or years—they require decades. China is a case in point: it has developed its industrial capacity in parallel with massive investment in research. In 2000, China accounted for just 6% of global manufacturing output; by 2020, that share had risen to 30%, with projections suggesting it could reach 45% by 2030. Today, China is the world’s leading manufacturing power, dominating strategic sectors such as solar energy and electric batteries, where its production share already exceeds 80%.

Over the past twenty years, Chinese automobile production has risen from 1% to 39% of the global total, while Europe’s share has fallen from 35% to 15%, and the United States’ from 15% to just 3%. Chinese car exports have grown exponentially—from 500,000 units in 2016 to 4.7 million in 2024—making China the world’s top car exporter, overtaking Japan. In the electric vehicle sector, Chinese company BYD has emerged as the global leader, with 2.9 million vehicles sold in 2023, followed by the U.S.-based Tesla with 1.8 million. Behind them are six other brands with sales between 400,000 and 500,000 units, evenly split between Chinese and German companies. Currently, China boasts 32 different electric vehicle manufacturers.

In the field of technology and innovation, China is increasingly dominating the global stage. As a result, its market share is expected to continue growing, while that of European industries is likely to shrink. In 2021, China filed 37.8% of the world’s patents, compared to 17.8% from the United States and 16% from Japan. Today, it leads in 29 out of 36 key sectors, including computing, electronics, and telecommunications, while Europe plays an increasingly marginal role.

A particularly telling example is artificial intelligence. In January 2025, Chinese company DeepSeek released open-source models superior to GPT-4, shaking the Western tech and financial sectors. This didn’t come out of nowhere: as early as 2022, China held 61% of patents in generative AI, compared to 21% for the U.S. and just 2% for Europe (including the UK).

Europe’s marginalization in the automotive sector, manufacturing in general, technological innovation, and scientific research is not the result of external factors like Trump, Musk, Putin, or Xi. It is the outcome of decades of lacking an industrial and economic policy—both nationally and at the EU level. Contrary to expectations, the “market” has failed to fill this gap.

At the root of this issue lies a steady decline in funding for universities and education, which has stifled the development of innovative research. Finally, as Draghi himself noted in his September report, the war in Ukraine and the loss of Russian gas pipelines have left European businesses facing electricity prices 2–3 times higher than in the U.S., and natural gas prices 4–5 times higher.

This combination of technological decline and soaring energy costs has had a devastating effect on European manufacturing—undermining competitiveness, triggering industrial crises, plant closures, and layoffs. In the medium term, this will likely lead to economic and social decline.

While public debate spirals around an increasingly abstract idea of Europe, the concrete decisions we should be discussing are quite different. The proposed solution? Convert the European automotive industry to arms production. Inability to compete in the civilian market is thus offset by government contracts, justified in the name of defense. In this scenario, the electric motors of advanced cars are replaced by the diesel engines of tanks, while the climate change debate quietly vanishes from the stage.

However, this is merely a temporary solution—one that benefits only the large players in the military-industrial complex. It will not solve the problem of competitiveness in technological innovation, nor that of defense. On the contrary, it risks deepening social tensions.