by Francesco Sylos Labini

In his 1992 essay The End of History and the Last Man, political scientist Francis Fukuyama argued that with the defeat of its two main rivals — fascism and communism — liberal democracy would establish itself as the definitive model for the political organization of states, the market economy as the dominant economic structure, and Western values as the universal ethical reference point. According to this vision, these pillars would no longer face significant challengers, effectively enshrining Margaret Thatcher’s famous motto: There is no alternative. The European project was also built upon these premises.

Today, however, those Western values — already undermined by the many wars fought in the name of “exporting democracy” — appear shattered, like the rubble of Gaza. The market economy has been strangled by the growing concentration of economic power, generating unimaginable and insurmountable inequalities, to the point of emptying the very meaning of voting: in Western democracies, elections are increasingly perceived as a sterile routine, incapable of producing real change, and thus are boycotted by a growing share of citizens. The European project, born from those premises, now reveals all its fragility. Europe appears as a heterogeneous grouping of states, with interests and visions too divergent to sustain a truly common political, economic, and ethical project.

The war in Ukraine, rather than acting as a unifying force, has deepened divisions, becoming a centrifugal power. To the tragedy of the conflict was added a dramatic increase in energy costs, which has pushed European manufacturing out of global competition. It is no surprise, then, that many observers see the break in the energy-tech link between Germany and Russia — based on an exchange of cheap energy for advanced technology — as one of the strategic objectives pursued by certain international actors. Today, Europe finds itself without affordable energy and, even more seriously, without technological autonomy, which has been lost in the bureaucratic labyrinths of Brussels. Even the supply of raw materials essential to industrial development — such as rare earth elements — has become complex and uncertain.

Faced with these structural challenges, the first step must be a cultural paradigm shift: a Copernican revolution that requires recognizing that the world’s center of gravity has shifted eastward; that the United States pursues its own interests above all else; and that Europe, unless it overcomes this psychological trauma, risks entering a long period of marginalization. The Copernican Revolution took centuries to abandon the illusion of man at the center of the universe; today, we need a similar effort — but much faster. The global scientific and technological center has now moved eastward, and the only realistic development trajectory passes through the Chinese economic ecosystem, particularly in the strategic sectors of solar energy and electric mobility. In these fields, China has overtaken the rest of the world thanks to long-term investments that have involved the entire supply chain — from access to raw materials to the training of scientists and engineers, to the creation of a highly competitive industrial system. Today, the country is a leader in environmental technologies, accounting for nearly 30% of global innovations, compared to just 15% for Europe and the U.S.

This result was made possible by a model that combines free market competition among companies with strategic direction set by the state.

As Pino Arlacchi points out in his essay China Explained to the West, these are the factors that enabled a 90% reduction in the cost of batteries and solar panels in under 15 years. Once the domestic market was saturated, Chinese companies began exporting to developing countries with high energy demand, fostering the expansion of renewables in Brazil, India, and Vietnam, and the transition to electric power in poorer countries like Ethiopia and Nepal. This does not immediately solve the climate crisis, as most energy still comes from fossil fuels. However, the collapse in the prices of Chinese technology is making possible a transition to renewables that would have been unthinkable just ten years ago. A faint light is visible at the end of a still long and dark tunnel. And it is precisely from this comparison that we must begin to rethink the heart of our system: a model centered on immediate-return investments cannot face challenges that require research, innovation, and long-term planning. Until we change this logic, we will continue chasing the future instead of building it.