The difference between United Nations international law and the so-called “rules-based international order” (RBIO) is not merely conceptual; it is substantive and politically crucial.
International law is a body of binding legal norms that govern relations among sovereign states. Its foundations lie in the United Nations Charter, signed in 1945, in multilateral treaties such as the Geneva Conventions or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in customary international law based on shared practices, and in the jurisprudence of institutions such as the International Court of Justice. Its key principles include the sovereignty and legal equality of states, non-interference in internal affairs, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and, above all, the prohibition of the use of force—except in cases of self-defense or when explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council. In short, it is a codified, multilateral body of law, universally recognized and formally binding for all member states of the United Nations.
The concept of a “rules-based international order,” by contrast, is not legal in nature but geopolitical. It is an ideological construction promoted primarily by Western countries—namely the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan—and refers to a set of norms, practices, and “values” that do not always align with codified international law but are nonetheless deemed legitimate by these states according to their worldview. The rules-based order encompasses decision-making and enforcement mechanisms that lie outside the UN framework. These include structures such as NATO, the G7, the G20, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and instruments such as unilateral sanctions, which are not recognized under international law. This “order” is often invoked to justify unilateral or multilateral interventions not authorized by the UN Security Council, in the name of protecting human rights, liberal democracy, global security, and so forth.
The rules-based order, therefore, does not rest on a universally recognized legal foundation. It is a selective normative vision, constructed and imposed by a power bloc that dominates the world’s major economic, military, and media institutions. In essence, while international law is law, the “rules-based order” is politics. Confusing the two—as is often done in public discourse, the media, and official statements—serves to obscure the steady erosion of legal universalism and to legitimize arbitrary exercises of power outside the bounds of international legality.
This slippage—from codified law to discretionary rules—also manifests itself in cases involving individuals. One emblematic case is that of Jacques Baud, a former Swiss officer and military analyst, recently sanctioned by the European Union (not the only case, but arguably the most prominent). Baud was placed on a sanctions list pursuant to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2568, adopted under the EU’s restrictive measures targeting “manipulative and pro-Russian information activities” deemed to impact the war in Ukraine. The sanctions include asset freezes and bans on entry and transit within the Union.
It is important to emphasize that this is an administrative measure, not a judicial one. It is not based on a criminal conviction or any formal indictment in a court of law. This kind of measure does not require a public hearing or afford the individual the opportunity to defend themselves in an adversarial proceeding. It is a tool embedded in the EU’s foreign and security policy competencies, which allow the adoption of restrictive measures without judicial oversight.
Although formally legal within the EU legal framework, the regulation is effectively extrajudicial. It is not issued by a court, does not involve a formal charge, is not preceded by a public inquiry, and, crucially, does not provide the sanctioned individual with the fundamental protections guaranteed under civil or criminal law—such as the presumption of innocence, the right to defense, and due process.
For these reasons, despite complying with internal EU procedures, such sanctions are frequently described by legal scholars as “extra-legal.” They are political or ideological instruments, based on vague criteria like “pro-Russian influence” or “disinformation activities,” imposed without transparency and without offering the affected person a genuine opportunity to defend themselves. Numerous legal experts—particularly Swiss and French lawyers—have questioned the substantive legitimacy of these measures. They argue that such actions violate Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to a fair trial), damage a person’s reputation without a formal finding of guilt, and are extremely difficult to challenge, since the only available recourse is an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union, a process marked by high costs and long delays.
The replacement of international law with a “rules-based order” mirrors the Baud case: both offer paradigmatic examples of the shift from law to politics, from codified norms to regulatory arbitrariness. They demonstrate how, in many cases, rules have become a surrogate for law—not a mechanism to protect the weak, but one that serves to entrench the power of the strong. Yet when the powerful abandon law, they simultaneously forfeit the legitimacy that sustains them; in the long run, by doing so, they render themselves vulnerable.
Francesco sylos labini 
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